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INTRODUCTION
The integrated avionics reliability task is an effort to build credible
reliability/performability models for multisensor integrated navigation and
flight control. The 1986 research was initiated by the reliability analysis of
a multtsensor navigation system consisting of the Global Positioning System
(GPS), the Long Range Navigation system (Loran-C), and an inertial measurement
unit (IMU). Markov reliability models were developed based on system failure
rates and mission time.
Figure I shows the mechanization of the multlsensor navigation system
based on GPS, Loran-C, and an IMU. Each sensor is implemented with triple
redundancy. The decision making logic determines which sensors are to be used
for navigation based on the Kalman filter residuals. Figure 2 depicts the state
transition diagram for the multisensor system. The corresponding 16-state
Markov model is shown in figure 3, with the assumption that no repairs are made
during system operation.
In order to obtain position information from the IMU both the accelero-
meters and the gyros are needed. Using this information, the state transition
diagram can be reduced to eight states as depicted in figure 4. The
corresponding reduced Markov model is shown in figure 5. From the state tran-
sition matrix the stochastic probability matrix (SPM) can be obtained. The ele-
ments of the SPM represent the probabilities that the system will remain in a
certain state (diagonal elements) and the probabilities that the system will
make a transition to another state (off-diagonal elements). The SPM for the
integrated navigation system is given in figure 6 along with the reliability
formulas.
Starting the system from the initial state probability vector P(0), the
state probabilities for some time later can be found by multiplying the state
probability vector by the stochastic probability matrix. The number of
multiplications is determined by the quotient of the mission time and the time
interval between state updates.
As an example, consider the configuration as depicted in figure 1 and
assume that the mean time between failure for each sensor is equal to 4,500
hours. It then follows that the probability of system failure during a mission
with a duration of one hour is approximately one part in one hundred billion.
DISCRETE MARKOV CHAIN COMPRESSION METHOD
Markov analysis is based on the Stochastic Probability Matrix (SPM). The
dimension of the SPM is determined by the nth power of two, where n is
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the number of sensors in the system. For example, if a system consists of
eight sensors, the dimension of the SPM is 256 by 256. Manipulation of
matrices of this size is rather complicated.
A solution to the manipulation of large stochastic matrices was found
by separating the sensors into statistically independent sets; i.e. the
Discrete Markov Chain Compression Method (DMCCM). Figure 7 illustrates the
DMCCM, the sensors are separated in sets and individual Markov models are
made for the corresponding sets. The output of each smaller Markov model
represents the failure probability for the given sensor set. All those
outputs are merged into smaller size models again, until a single output is
produced. The final (single) output represents the failure probability of
the last system state for the specified mission time. This is also the
probability that the system will have a total failure during the given
mission time. A detailed description of the DMCCM can be found in
reference 1.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Next year's reliability effort is defined with input from NASA
Langley Research Center. This effort deals with the creation of a generic
reliability tool for flight control systems operating in tile terminal area.
Figure 8 shows a multisensor flight control baseline system for terminal
area guidance. The reliability model for this system is depicted in figure
9. The attitude, air data, and navigation aids are in series for the
reliability evaluation since the system will fail if any of these three
components fails.
In addition to the evaluation of a more complex avionics system, the
system will also be allowed to incorporate fault detection and isolation
(FDI) techniques (ref. 2). Adding FDI to the system increases the
complexity of the reliability evaluation tremendously. This is illustrated
in figures 10 and 11. Figure 10 shows the Markov model for a two-sensor
system without FDI. Adding probabilities of fault detection, isolation,
transient recovery, false alarm, and damage results in the Markov mode]
shown in figure 11.
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Figure I. Multisensor navigation system mechanization for reliability
analysis of an integrated GPS, Loran-C, and inertial
measurement unit system.
STATE DEFINITION
1 GYROS, ACCELGPS, LORAN
2 GYROS. ACCEL,GPS, LORAN
3 GYROS, ACCEL,GPS----.LORAN
4 GYROS, ACCEL,GPS, LORAN
5 GYROS.ACCEL,GPS. LORAN
6 GYROS. ACCEL,GPS, LORAN
7 GYROS, ACCEL,GPS, IX)RAN
g GYROS, ACCE---'_.GPS,LORAN
9 GYROS.^CCEL, GPS, LORAN
10 GYRO''"_,ACCEL,GPS-'_,LORAN
11 GYROS, ACCEL, GPS, LORAN
12 GYROS, ACCEL,GPS, LORAN
13 GYRO'-"S,ACCEL, GPS, LORAN
14 GYROS,ACCEL, GPS,LORAN
15 GYROS, ACCE'_GPS'mLORAN
16 GYROS, ACCEL,GPS, LORAN
GYROS- GYROSGOOD
GYROS - GYROS FAILED
ACCEL- ACCELEROMETERSGOOD
ACCEL. ACCELEROMETERSFAILED
GPS - GPSGOOD
GPS - GPS FAILED
LORAN - LORAN-CGOOD
LORAN - LORAN-C FAILED
Figure 2. State transition diagram for the reliability analysis of a
multtsensor navigation system based on GPS, Loran-C, and
and an inertial measurement unit.
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Figure 3. Sixteen-state Markov model for the reliability analysis of
an integrated navigation system based on GPS, Loran-C, and
and an inertial measurement unit.
STATE DEFINITION
1 IMU, GPS, LORAN
2 IMU, GPS, LORAN
3
I'_, GPS, LORAN
4 IMU, GPS, LORAN
5 IMU, GPS, LORAN
6 IMU, GPS, LORAN
7 IMU, GPS, LORAN
8 IMU, GPS, IX)RAN
IMU = INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT GOOD
IMU = INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT FAILED
GPS = GPS GOOD
GPS = GPS FAILED
LORAN = LORAN - C GOOD
LORAN = LORAN - C FAILED
Figure 4. Reduced state transition diagram for the reliability analysis
of an Integrated navigation system based on GPS, Loran-C,
and an inertial measurement unit.
54
2 5
2,5
1,2 5,8
1 3 6 8
1,3 6,8
4,5 L7 7,_
7
4,7
IA= ACCELEROMETERS (3) "_
I6= GYROS (3) .,) IMUG = GPS
L = LORAN-C
E = EMERGENCY
Figure 5. Reduced Markov model for the reliability analysis of an
integrated navigation system based on GPS, Loran-C, and
an inertial measurement unit.
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Figure 6. State transition matrix and reliability equations for the
integrated navigation system.
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Figure 7. Functional block diagram representation of the Discrete
Markov Chain Compression Method (DMCCM).
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Figure 8. Multlsensor flight control baseline system mechanization for
terminal area guidance.
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NAVArDS
AIR DATA
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IAS: INDICA'I "EDAIRSPEED
MLS: MICROWAVE LANDING SYSTEM
Figure 9. Reliability diagram for the multisensor flight control system.
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Figure I0. A two-sensor Markov model without fault detection and
isolation.
PFA = PROB. OF FAILURE FOR SENSOR A
PD = PROB. OF DETECTION
D,
iF= SENSOR i FAILED Pn = PROB. OF ISOLATION
BUT WAS NOT PDAM= PROB. OF DAMAGE
DETECTED PFAL= PROB. OF FALSE ALARM
PTR= PROB. OF TRANSIENT RECOVERY
2 4
3,3 5,5
Figure II. A two-sensor Markov model with fault detection and isolation
including probabilities of failure detection, isolation,
transient recovery, false alarm, and damage.
58
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
59
